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NOTES
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN MONTANA:
THE COST OF INEXCUSABLE NEGLECT OR
THE DEATH OF TRIAL ON THE MERITS?
Sara F. Tappen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst moving boxes brimming with carefully drafted docu-
ments, a legal assistant stands bewildered by all that has tran-
spired in the past weeks. Her sole living brother lies partially par-
alyzed in a hospital bed-after nearly choking to death, lack of
oxygen caused him to lapse into a coma from which he emerged
with partial brain damage.1 Her mind races as she reviews the
arrangements she must make for his rehabilitation. At the same
time, her thoughts wander to the report she just received from her
own doctor: she survived breast cancer two years ago, but now the
enemy is back, this time as a melanoma-type growth on her leg.2
She too will require medical treatment in the days ahead. She
feels the room spinning and lowers herself to rest on the boxes.
Her employer's law practice has had to relocate twice in the past
six months due to the demolition of their previous office building.3
* Candidate for J.D. 2008, The University of Montana School of Law. The author is grateful to
her parents, Hornby and Faith Howland, for their continuous encouragement and guidance; to her dear
friend Lavonne Stevens, for her wisdom and model of unshakable faith; and to Peter, "The Wonderful
Husband," for everything. Psalm 119:73.
1. Br. of Appellant at 4, Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3-4; Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201, 201-04 (Mont. 2005).
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Reorganizing the entire office will complete the final phase of
their move.
Such were the circumstances under which a legal assistant
misfiled the wrongful discharge complaint which led to a default
judgment being entered against Don K Chevrolet, her employer's
client. 4 One might intuitively identify such circumstances as the
sort which lead to the unfortunate "mistake" spoken of in Rule
60(b)(1) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 The Rules pro-
vide for setting aside default judgment in unique circumstances 6
because the entire purpose of the Rules is "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."7 How-
ever, in Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, the Montana Supreme
Court rejected the turmoil and subsequent mistake of defense
counsel's legal assistant as excusable neglect for failing to answer
Krist Matthews's complaint, and declined to set aside the default
judgment.8 Instead, the Court pointed to, and relied heavily upon,
the existence of a letter for which the District Court lacked proper
record.9 The letter, allegedly written by the plaintiffs lawyer,
Chisholm, ostensibly advised defendant's counsel, Jack Quatman,
that a hearing on default judgment and damages would be held
the following week. Quatman denied ever receiving the communi-
cation from Chisholm, yet beyond the excusable misfiling error,
the Court's decision professes to hinge on the receipt of this un-
documented letter. 10
This note will first review the early proceedings in this wrong-
ful termination action and the Montana Supreme Court's holding
on each of the important issues. In its second part, the note will
discuss the interpretation and application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure relevant to the issue of default judgment-Rules 55(c) 1'
4. Id.
5. Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The relevant part of the statute reads:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
legal party's representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ....
Id.
6. Id.
7. Mont. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
8. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 204.
9. Id. at 207-08 (Warner, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 204-05 (majority).
11. Mont. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The relevant part of the statute reads:
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judg-
ment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
228 Vol. 69
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and 60(b)12-in addition to reviewing Montana precedent relevant
to the interpretation of these rules in situations parallel to the
narrow facts in Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet. Lastly, the note will
analyze the Court's reasoning and decision in affirming the de-
fault judgment entered against Don K Chevrolet, and the impact
of this pronouncement on prospective defendants in Montana.
II. MATTHEWS V. DON K CHEVROLET
A. Facts
Krist Matthews was one of five employees who challenged the
termination of their employment by Don K Chevrolet. Wade Fish,
represented by attorney Dean Chisholm, was the first of the ter-
minated employees to file suit.13 Matthews and three other plain-
tiffs attempted to consolidate their claims into one action against
Don K Chevrolet by moving to join Fish's action as additional par-
ties. Don K Chevrolet opposed the motion for consolidation and
the District Court denied it. Each plaintiff was instead required
to file an individual action. 14 All five plaintiffs eventually re-
tained Chisholm to represent them,15 and Quatman represented
Don K Chevrolet in all of the individual actions.16
Three of the four plaintiffs who had attempted to join the Fish
lawsuit filed individually in July 2003.17 Matthews, however, did
not file his complaint until September 11, 2003.18 On October 14,
2003, without conferring with Don K Chevrolet, Quatman signed
the acknowledgement of service for Matthews's complaint.
Quatman then gave it, along with the summons and the com-
plaint, to his assistant. She mailed the acknowledgement to
Chisholm, who in turn filed it with the District Court.19 However,
Quatman's legal assistant, due to personal and professional diffi-
12. Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The discussion here will be limited to subsections (1) and (6),
which read:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ... or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment.
Id.
13. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 202.
14. Id. at 203.
15. Id. at 202-03.
16. Id. at 203.
17. See Br. of Appellant at 3, Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2005).
18. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 203.
19. Id.
2008 229
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culties, 20 failed to log the acknowledgement into the computer and
calendar the answer's due date. She also failed to open a file for
Matthews and set a conference date with the client. Instead, she
inadvertently misfiled Matthews's summons and complaint in
Wade Fish's file. 21
On November 7, 2003, when no answer had been filed within
the mandatory twenty days, Chisholm filed a praecipe for default
which the Clerk of Court entered on the same day. The court set a
hearing on entry of default judgment and damages for December
11, 2003, at Chisholm's request, and notice of the hearing was
filed with the Clerk of Court.22
Here, the parties' stories diverge. In his appellate response
brief, Chisholm reported mailing a letter to Quatman on Decem-
ber 4, 2003, in which he stated his discontentment over having
taken the default, adding that he was "not entirely morose either"
since "your client said he wanted to play hardball and requested
Rule 11 sanctions against me."23 The letter allegedly gave notice
of the upcoming hearing.
Defense counsel denied ever receiving the letter. In fact,
Quatman told the Court that he had no idea a default had been
entered against his client until a month later.24 Consequently, no
one attended the hearing on behalf of Don K Chevrolet, and a de-
fault judgment was entered against the defendant for $185,000,
including a startling $88,608 punitive damage award. 25
Quatman testified by affidavit that he learned of the misfiling
of the Matthews complaint on January 5, 2004, when he per-
formed a routine inventory of his active files at the end of the
quarter. 26 Upon discovering that the Matthews complaint had
been misfiled in the Fish file, Quatman immediately proceeded to
the courthouse where, after speaking with the Clerk of Court, he
first discovered default had been entered against his client.27
On January 7, 2004, within twenty-six days of entry of the
default judgment, Quatman filed a motion to set the judgment
20. Id. at 201, 204; see also Br. of Appellant at 3-4, Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115
P.3d 201 (Mont. 2005).
21. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 203.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 207 (Warner, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 208.
26. Br. of Appellant at 4-5, Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2005).
27. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 207 (Warner, J., dissenting).
Vol. 69230
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aside.28 In his brief on the motion, Quatman explained the cir-
cumstances surrounding the mistake that had occurred in his of-
fice, and the reason his client had made no appearance at all in
the matter.29 He did not mention having received any letter from
Chisholm regarding the hearing that had taken place.
Chisholm filed a response brief and appended a copy of the
letter he said he sent to Quatman's office. Only then, in his reply
brief, did Quatman first address the letter, stating: "Counsel has
referred to a letter which he sent to the office noticing the default
hearing date. That letter was never received at this office. Had it
been received, I would have immediately filed a motion to set
aside the default and I most definitely would had [sic] been at the
court hearing. ''30
To make matters worse, the district court failed in its own
recordkeeping and did not set a date for a hearing on Quatman's
motion to set aside the default.31 The district court had not even
considered whether Don K Chevrolet's counsel had actually re-
ceived the letter and notice before the Montana Supreme Court
received the appeal.32 The district court acknowledged that its
mistake in calendaring the case had resulted in the denial of the
motion not by virtue of the district court's discretion in ruling on
this matter, but by failure of the court to properly exercise juris-
diction in ruling on the defendant's motion.33 The district court
went so far as to prepare a "Notice of Denial" acknowledging the
error and its failure to rule on the motion. 34 The denial of the
motion at the district court level thus occurred by operation of
law, and not by the lower court having exercised discretion at
all.35
B. Holding
The Montana Supreme Court held that the slightest abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court would warrant reversal
28. Id. at 203.
29. See Br. of Appellant at 3-5, Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201 (Mont.
2005).
30. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 207 (Warner, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 207-08; see also Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(c). The relevant part of the statute reads:
"... if the court shall fail to rule on the motion within the 60 day period, the motion shall be
deemed denied."
34. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 207 (Warner, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
2008
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in this case.36 However, the majority held that the denial of Don
K Chevrolet's motion to set aside the entry of default judgment
and the default judgment itself did not constitute a slight abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court.37 The majority held
that Quatman had "ample opportunity to answer Matthews's com-
plaint,"38 and the lack of attention to the complaint constituted "a
serious disregard of the judicial process and cannot be considered
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure."39
Additionally, the Court held that the lawyer's actions were
not grossly negligent, nor did they constitute misconduct under
Rule 60(b)(6). 40 The Court held that Don K Chevrolet had notice
of Matthews's claim by virtue of the fact that several months ear-
lier Matthews had attempted to join the Fish lawsuit on similar
charges of wrongful termination.4 1 The Court concluded that the
former employer was not "completely innocent in the matter...
[nor] blameless for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6)." 42 Subsequently, the
Court held that any neglect on the part of Quatman should prop-
erly be charged to Don K Chevrolet. 43
III. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RULES
A. Competing Policies
The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, like their federal coun-
terpart, strive to maintain a balance between competing poli-
cies.4 4 Through the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel, the judicial system promotes finality in litigation. 45 The Mon-
tana Supreme Court has noted that "[t]here must be some point at
which litigation ends and the respective rights between the par-
ties are forever established. '46
36. Id. at 203 (majority).
37. Id. at 206.
38. Id. at 204.
39. Id. at 205.
40. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 205.
41. Id. at 206.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re Marriage of Hopper, 991 P.2d 960, 968 (Mont. 1999).
45. Lawlor v. Natl. Screen Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
46. In re Marriage of Weber, 96 P.3d 716, 721 (Mont. 2004).
Vol. 69232
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On the other hand, default judgments are never favored by
the courts,47 who have always expressed a preference for dispos-
ing of a case brought before them by trial on the merits. While
Rule 55(c) allows a court to set aside a simple entry of default
upon a showing of good cause, Rule 60(b) allows courts liberal dis-
cretion in setting aside default judgments when a defendant
presents the existence of a meritorious defense. 48 The United
States Supreme Court emphasized the role of this latter rule when
it held in Klapprott v. U.S. that "[Rule] 60(b) strongly indicates on
its face that courts no longer are to be hemmed in by the uncertain
boundaries of ... common law remedial tools." 49
B. Rule 55(c)
Under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may set
aside an entry of default upon a showing of good cause.50 In deter-
mining good cause for setting aside an entry of default, "the court
should consider whether: (1) plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) defen-
dant has a meritorious defense; and (3) defendant's culpable con-
duct led to the default."51 Additionally, courts in all jurisdictions
have consistently affirmed that "the rules relating to default judg-
ments should be liberally construed in favor of defendants, and of
the desirability of resolving litigation on the merits, to the end
that fairness and justice are served."52
C. Rule 60(b)
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."53 The Montana Su-
preme Court has held that, as a general rule, cases are "to be tried
47. Peak Dev., LLP v. Juntunen, 110 P.3d 13, 15 (Mont. 2005).
48. Sun Mt. Sports, Inc. v. Gore, 85 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Mont. 2004).
49. Klapprott v. U.S., 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949).
50. Mont. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
51. Marbly v. City ofSouthfield, 9 Fed. Appx. 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished);
see also Cribb v. Matlock Commun., Inc., 768 P.2d 337, 339 (Mont. 1989) (citing James W.
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice vol. 6, § 55.50[1] [a] at 55-58.1 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al.
eds., 3d ed., Matthew Bender 2006)).
52. Dougherty v. Surgen, 518 A.2d 364, 365 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Desjarlais v. Gilman,
463 A.2d 234, 237 (Vt. 1983)) (emphasis added).
53. Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 664, 684-85 (2006).
2008
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on their merits and that judgments by default are not favored."54
Where a motion to set aside a default judgment is made and "sup-
ported by a showing that leaves responsible minds in doubt, courts
tend to resolve doubts in favor of the motion, since courts favor a
trial on the issues over a default judgment."55 The Montana Su-
preme Court has held that in cases where the motion is so
promptly made after default has been entered that "[n]o consider-
able delay to the plaintiff is to be occasioned by permitting a de-
fense on the merits, the court ought to incline to relieve." 56 In
Brothers v. Brothers, Justice Ranking remarked that "[n]o great
abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to set aside a de-
fault need to be shown to warrant a reversal, for the courts univer-
sally favor a trial on the merits. '57
However, there are certain necessary requirements for setting
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b): a party seeking to set
aside a default judgment must show both good cause for doing so
and the existence of a meritorious defense. 58 The motion must be
made within sixty days of entry of the default judgment and must
be based on one of the six reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b). 59
Furthermore, relief may not be obtained under 60(b)(6) if it is
available under 60(b)(1) through (5).60
When a district court fails to rule on a motion to set aside a
default judgment within the time provided by the Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure, the motion is deemed denied by operation of
law.61 If the district court deliberately exercised its discretion by
54. Lords v. Newman, 688 P.2d 290, 293 (Mont. 1984); Little Horn St. Bank v. Real
Bird, 598 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Mont. 1979).
55. Twenty-Seventh St., Inc. v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 210, 211 (Mont. 1986).
56. Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201, 206 (Mont. 2005) (citing Benedict v.
Spenddiff, 22 P. 500, 500 (Mont. 1889)) (Warner, J., dissenting). Justice Warner noted that
"[w]ith remarkable consistency, the Court has articulated the essence of this principle for
116 years." Id.
57. Brothers v. Brothers, 230 P. 60, 61 (Mont. 1924) (emphasis added).
58. First Natl. Bank of Cut Bank v. Springs, 731 P.2d 332, 335 (Mont. 1987).
59. Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The relevant part of the statute reads:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evi-
dence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Id.
60. Maulding v. Hardman, 847 P.2d 292, 297 (Mont. 1993).
61. Mont. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
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not ruling, the slight abuse of discretion standard of review at-
taches.62 However, if a district court has inadvertently allowed
time to lapse and has simply lost jurisdiction to rule on the mo-
tion, that court has not exercised its discretion at all, raising a
question whether the slight abuse standard of review should be
applied. 63 The burden still remains on the defaulting party to
demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense and good cause
for setting aside the judgment.64
D. Default Judgment in Montana Case Law
Among the numerous cases where the Court has reversed the
entry of default judgment, two cases on point with the facts in
Matthews are worthy of further examination: Blume v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company65 and Keller v. Hanson.66
In its 1990 Blume decision, the Montana Supreme Court set
aside a default judgment entered against the defendant Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Company, where, similar to Matthews, the
plaintiff had filed a wrongful termination action against her for-
mer employer.6 7 The defendant had received the plaintiffs sum-
mons and complaint and entered it in their mail log, but somehow
these documents were never delivered to anyone in a position of
authority within the company.68 The court entered judgment
against Metropolitan, and within ten days of learning of the judg-
ment, Metropolitan moved to set aside the default. The district
court failed to rule on the motion to set aside default judgment
within forty-five days, and therefore the motion was deemed de-
nied. 69
Metropolitan appealed the denial of the motion. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court reviewed the rules and general policy regard-
ing the setting aside of default judgment, and restated the impor-
tance of "two basic tenets: (1) every litigated case should be tried
on its merits and default judgments are not favored and (2) trial
courts have a certain amount of discretion when considering a mo-
62. Peak Dev., LLP v. Juntunen, 110 P.3d 13, 14-15 (Mont. 2005).
63. Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201, 207 (Mont. 2005) (Warner, J., dissent-
ing).
64. Siewing v. Pearson Co., 736 P.2d 120, 122 (Mont. 1987).
65. Blume v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 791 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990), overruled, Matthews v.
Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2005).
66. Keller v. Hanson, 485 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1971).
67. Blume, 791 P.2d at 785.
68. Id.
69. Id.
2008 235
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tion to set aside a default judgment."70 The Court then reaffirmed
its consistent position on the issue, summoning a statement from
its 1905 decision in Greene v. Montana Brewing Co.:
Negligence or inadvertence directly traceable to a party litigant or
his attorney... has many times been held sufficient to warrant the
opening of a default, and trial courts have not infrequently been re-
versed for their refusal to set aside defaults under such circum-
stances.
7 1
The Court found Metropolitan had produced sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate it had proceeded with "utmost diligence,"
and had presented a meritorious defense for which affidavits of
merit were not required. 72 The Court pointed out that, while the
former employee had threatened to file a lawsuit in the matter of
her discharge, Metropolitan had no knowledge or information
causing them to believe the lawsuit had actually been filed.73 Fi-
nally, the Court held that the judgment, if allowed to stand, would
injuriously affect Metropolitan. 74
In Keller v. Hanson,75 the Court held that the defense attor-
ney's misfiling of a pleading in another active file of the same cli-
ent was an adequate reason for setting aside a default judgment
against his client.76 After reviewing the facts presented by a Rule
60(b)(1) motion, the Court vacated the default judgment entered
against Hanson for failure to file a timely answer to Keller's com-
plaint. Hanson's attorney had stated generally that there was a
meritorious defense and that the plaintiffs complaint had been
inadvertently misfiled under one of the defendant's other active
files with the firm.7 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision, stating that "the trial court should exercise liberality
since judgment by default is not favored."78
The Keller Court affirmed that Montana had long recognized
that the reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1) could not be pled in
the abstract. "The universal rule is that there must be a state-
ment of facts so that the court can determine whether or not the
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect urged in sup-
70. Id. (quoting Lords v. Newman, 688 P.2d 290, 293 (Mont. 1984)).
71. Id. at 787 (quoting Greene v. Mont. Brewing Co., 79 P. 693, 694 (Mont. 1905)).
72. Id. at 786-87.
73. Blume, 791 P.2d at 787.
74. Id. (stating "a judgment in excess of $185,000 adversely affects even the biggest
corporation").
75. Keller v. Hanson, 485 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1971).
76. Id. at 707.
77. Id. at 706.
78. Id. at 707.
Vol. 69
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port of the motion is within the contemplation of the statute."79
While the Court confirmed that facts must be presented to the
trial court, it held there was no requirement that these facts be
made known through affidavits of merit.80 Instead, the Court
noted a "departure from the rigid procedural philosophy to one of
substance which is modeled after the federal rules in an effort to
more equitably reflect the true intent of the law."8' Once again,
the Court emphasized that substance is to be favored over form.
IV. ANALYSIS
During its analysis of Matthews, the Montana Supreme Court
pointed to the Blume standard as the general standard of review
when lower courts refuse to set aside defaults and default judg-
ments.8 2 However, as noted by Justice Warner in his dissent, the
majority erroneously applied a general standard of review to a
case where the district court purposefully, and almost apologeti-
cally, admitted its failure to exercise any discretion at all in ruling
on the motion to set aside default judgment 8 3 Thus, a "liberal
interpretation" of the provisions of Rule 60(b) concerning relief
from a default judgment ought to have prevailed where the dis-
trict court had not even considered the motion.8 4 While the courts
do not condone negligence in answering pleadings in a timely
manner, "default judgments are routinely vacated.., for the com-
pelling reason that 'substantial justice' between the parties gener-
ally requires a hearing on the merits."8 5 Where doubt exists, the
scales of justice have consistently tipped in favor of setting aside
default judgments to ensure trial on the merits.
Aside from the incorrect use of the slight abuse of discretion
standard of review, the majority also erroneously faulted defen-
dant Don K Chevrolet for somehow creating such unfortunate cir-
cumstances, by exercising its right to oppose consolidation of five
separate claims of wrongful discharge.8 6 In actuality, what the
79. Id. at 706 (quoting Robinson v. Petersen, 206 P. 1092, 1094 (Mont. 1922)).
80. Id. at 707.
81. Keller, 485 P.2d at 707.
82. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Jaycie, Inc., 99 P.3d 651, 653-55 (Mont. 2004) (further clarify-
ing this standard).
83. Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201, 206-07 (Mont. 2005) (Warner, J., dis-
senting).
84. Id. at 206.
85. Andreasen v. Suburban Bank of Bartlett, 527 N.E.2d 595, 600-01 (Ill. 1988).
86. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 206.
2008 237
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Court calls Don K Chevrolet's "litigation strategy"8 7 was no more
than a defendant's justified rationale in choosing to deal with each
plaintiff separately. The district court had denied the motion to
consolidate the five claims88 without any indication that the de-
nial prejudiced any party's claims or defenses.
The majority further reasoned that Don K Chevrolet was
alerted to Krist Matthews's claim by virtue of Matthews's attempt
to join the Fish claim-a claim originally filed in September 2002.
However "the mere filing of a complaint does not notify the de-
fendants that they have been sued and that the court intends to
render judgment on the dispute which is the subject of the law-
suit. The mechanism which accomplishes these purposes is the
summons."89 Don K Chevrolet was not advised of receipt of the
summons by its attorney until after a default judgment had been
entered against the company. It would not have been unreasona-
ble for Don K Chevrolet to assume, having not heard otherwise
from its attorney, that one of the five former employees might
have decided not to pursue litigation independently, in light of the
denial of the consolidation.
To hold inexcusable Don K Chevrolet's failure to stay abreast
of Matthews's filing status is to disregard the entire purpose of the
summons. 90 Proper service is a basic and necessary requirement
to the commencement of any action in order for a party to formally
and legally be on notice that he must defend against a lawsuit. 91
Until a defendant is fully alerted to the existence of a properly
filed complaint, he should not be held responsible for following up
on each and every threat by potential plaintiffs. Here, although
Quatman acknowledged service of the summons by mail, he failed
to inform his client that Matthews had properly filed and served a
complaint. The Court unfairly imputed to Don K Chevrolet the
legal assistant's failure-and consequently Quatman's failure-to
bring to its attention the opening of a new case against the com-
pany.
By interlocking Matthews's complaint with the complaints of
the other discharged employees, the Court disregarded the inde-
pendence of each claim. These employees were certainly con-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 203.
89. Cynthia Ford, Does It Have to Be This Hard? Rule 41(e) in Montana, 60 Mont. L.
Rev. 285, 287 (1999).
90. Id.
91. Mont. R. Civ. P. 4.
Vol. 69238
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/5
2008 DEFAULT JUDGMENT 239
nected to one another by a common goal-sufficiently connected to
explain the assistant's misfiling of the Matthews complaint in the
Fish file. However, they had lawfully been disjoined by the lower
court, so that Don K Chevrolet would not have to face them as one
entity, but independently. As each plaintiff filed and served his
own complaint, the defendant would be expected to answer. In
short, it is unfair for the majority to point to Don K Chevrolet's
awareness of the other four individual actions as sufficient reason
to hold that "Don K had notice of [Matthews's] claim,"92 when the
lower court had specifically separated the claims. 93
Finally, the Court faulted Don K Chevrolet for offering "no
evidence in the District Court to dispute the presumption that the
letter and notice mailed to its counsel were received."94 The Court
supported this remark by referencing Montana Code Annotated
§ 26-1-602(24), regarding disputable presumptions. 95 In accor-
dance with Rule 11,96 the truthfulness of briefs submitted to a
court must to be assumed. It is unclear how the Montana Su-
preme Court expected Don K Chevrolet to provide adequate sup-
port for its attorney's sworn statement of never having received a
letter which the plaintiff claimed was mailed to him. It was, after
all, entirely possible that the letter was not mailed or properly de-
livered.
It is ironic that the same Court that was unwilling to forgive
the mistake of defense counsel's assistant, was quick to assume
that the plaintiffs assistant, who presumably mailed the missing
letter to Quatman, could not have committed a similar clerical
mistake. The Court flatly rejected defense counsel's assertion that
he acted in good faith and proceeded with diligence once his legal
92. Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 115 P.3d 201, 206 (Mont. 2005).
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id. at 204 n. 1.
95. Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-602 (2005). The relevant part of the statute reads:
Disputable presumptions. All other presumptions are "disputable presumptions"
and may be controverted by other evidence. The following are of that kind ....
(24) A letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the
mail.
Id.
96. Mont. R. Civ. P. 11. The relevant part of the statute reads:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law... and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.
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assistant's mistake was discovered. But it embraced the assump-
tion that plaintiffs counsel, and the U.S. Postal Service, could not
have possibly made any mistake in the course of their daily busi-
ness activities.
In the end, the Court upheld the default judgment of $185,000
against the defendant, including $88,608 in punitive damages. In
so doing, the Court completely ignored a significant provision of
the Montana Code which states that punitive damages require
proof by "clear and convincing evidence."
97
V. CONCLUSION
The defendant in Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet was injured by
two clerical mistakes that were entirely out of its control-mis-
takes that were small, but very costly. First, Quatman failed to
notify Don K Chevrolet that Matthews filed a formal complaint
against the company. Second, Don K Chevrolet's counsel had no
opportunity to argue before the District Court that Rule 60(b) ap-
plied to this unfortunate turn of events, since the Clerk of Court
never calendared a hearing. Don K Chevrolet had neither control
over nor access to either office where the mistakes occurred: the
first error occurred in the office of Don K's counsel, and the second
error occurred in the office of the Clerk of District Court.
Adding insult to injury, the Montana Supreme Court placed
the fault for failing to answer the complaint not on the attorney or
his beleaguered assistant, who alone saw the complaint, but on
the client who was never made aware of its existence. In this
short opinion, the Court injured more than Don K Chevrolet by
referring to the breakdown in communication with the client as a
"serious disregard of the judicial process"9S-the whole purpose of
the Rules of Civil Procedure appears forgotten. One questions the
sensibleness of expecting clients who might be sued to regularly
perform inventories of their attorney's active files in search of
summonses and complaints that might have been misfiled. Nor
should a client be expected to be responsible for a district court's
proper calendaring and review of its motions.
Finally, it was strikingly unfair for the Court to impute cleri-
cal blunders to Don K Chevrolet under the pretense that the for-
mer employer had received adequate notice of the suit by Mat-
thews's prior attempt to join another employee's wrongful termi-
97. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221(5); Matthews, 115 P.3d at 208 (Warner, J., dissenting).
98. Matthews, 115 P.3d at 205 (majority).
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nation suit. The Court not only disregarded the all-important role
of the summons, but ignored the possibility that Matthews might
have opted not to sue his former employer after being prohibited
from joining the Fish suit. Based on Don K Chevrolet's knowledge
of the strengths and weaknesses of the Matthews case, it would
not have been inconceivable for the company to believe Krist Mat-
thews had abandoned his imminent, but incomplete, course of ac-
tion. However, the merits of Matthews's action will forever re-
main unknown. The majority, without admitting as much, exer-
cised its own discretion as to the legitimacy of Don K's reasons for
the lack of a timely answer.
The Court based its analysis largely upon the disputable pre-
sumption that the defendant received notice of the complaint. In-
stead of remanding the case to the district court for trial on the
merits-in light of the failure of the lower court to exercise its
rightful discretion in ruling on the motion to set aside default
judgment-the Court ruled harshly against the defendant. In an
unprecedented move, the Court overlooked unsettled questions of
fact, specifically those concerning whether the defendant received
proper notice of the hearing on the entry of default. It reviewed
the case in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, contrary to the
universal spirit of the Rules of Procedure and general legal prece-
dent. Bypassing its prior decision in Keller, where a counsel's mis-
filing of a pleading into another active file of the same client estab-
lished an adequate reason for setting aside a default judgment,
the Court set new precedent in Montana. In so doing, the Court
left potential defendants wondering if similar clerical mistakes
will result in their own loss of opportunity to defend themselves
for lack of notification of a pending lawsuit. The Rules' framers
never intended that a simple clerical mistake would deny a defen-
dant's right to access the courts of Montana.
2008
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